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Introduction
Contingency fee abuses are attracting increased public attention.' Partic-
ular interest is focused on the enormous contingency fees generated by mass
tort litigation; in some cases, lawyers are collecting multi-million dollar fees
essentially for performing paralegal work.2 In addition, the relationship
between the availability of enormous contingency fees and the amassing of
thousands of claims of injury in order to dramatically shift the litigation
dynamic in favor of plaintiffs is becoming increasingly apparent? For
example, the possibility that major ongoing massive litigations, such as
those involving silicone breast implants and the as yet nascent litigation
involving the contraceptive Norplant, have much less to do with injury and
much more to do with contingency fees is being increasingly broached in
the press, even in newspapers that usually have opposed most tort reform
efforts. 4
1. See generally Contingency Fee Abuses: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (Nov. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Contingency Fee Hearings].
2. U.S. District Court Judge Robert R. Merhige, presiding over the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust litigation, has stated:
It is to be borne in mind that counsel has already received, in the vast majority
of instances, fees of at least one-third of the gross settlement amount, plus costs.
These fees, in many instances, exceed $100,000.00 per claim, and the aggregate
fees received by some counsel, especially those with hundreds of cases, runs as
high as several million dollars per attorney or law firm. Generally, the sole
efforts related to such compensation consist of garnering medical records and
advising a client whether to accept a non-negotiable settlement offer.
In re A.H. Robins Co., 182 B.R. 128, 137 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1995).
3. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1995);
Lester Brickman, Class Action Reform: Beyond Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Research Memoran-
dum, Manhattan Institute 2-5 (October 1995) (on file with author); Lester Brickman, On the
Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are Principally
Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 1755, 1778-82 (1994)
[hereinafter Brickman, On the Relevance of Admissibility].
4. See Gina Kolata & Barry Meier, Implant Lawsuits Create A Medical Rush to Cash
In, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al (indicating that treatment for women with silicone
breast implants "has generated millions of dollars for a few doctors, who get bulk referrals
from lawyers"). These doctors have been criticized for "running assembly-line practices
intended more to help women collect vast court awards than to treat medical problems."
Id. The president of the American College of Rheumatology stated that "many of the tests
and treatments [were] 'a racket - there's no other word for it.'" 1d. at B8. Describing how
women could qualify to receive $200,000 or more from a settlement fund for complaints of
nonverifiable injuries such as aches and fatigue, one doctor admitted that "one of the
categories was so broad that you or I would have fit into it." Id. The article further indi-
cated that while some doctors - including doctors who frequently testify on behalf of plain-
tiffs - found silicone related problems in 90% of their patients, another doctor has found
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In addition to stories in the print media on contingency fee abuses,5
similar stories by television journalism programs now fill the airwaves.' A
contingency fee reform proposal co-authored by Professor Jeffrey
O'Connell of the University of Virginia Law School, Michael Horowitz of
the Hudson Institute, and myself,7 first announced in February 1994,8 his
elicited support from a broad range of practitioners, judges, scholars, and
editorial writers.9 The proposal has also received attention from state
that "just one to four percent of his patients had illnesses related to their implants." Id. Addi-
tionally, the article noted that "frequently, women are referred to [these] doctors by their
lawyers" and some of these doctors agreed to defer their fees until after a settlement or court
award. Id. One doctor explained that if he "did not diagnose silicone disease or if the woman
did not win her lawsuit, he would have to try to collect the money from the woman, not her
lawyer." Id.; see also Gina Kolata, New Study Finds No Link Between Implants and Illness,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1995, at A18 (indicating that definitive study of health effects of silicone
breast implants failed to find any association between implants and auto-immune tissue dis-
eases, and further indicating that despite scientific evidence, implant makers had entered into
$4 billion settlement of class action suit brought on behalf of women with implants); Gina
Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 3 at 1 (describing
parallels between Norplant litigation and breast implant litigation and discussing financial
interests of lawyers and doctors). One woman was told by her attorney to remove her Nor-
plant implant in order to preserve her claim for damages, even though she was very happy
with Norplant. Id. She reportedly asked her doctor: "Once I get my money, can I get a
second Norplant put in?" Id.; see also Anne Tergesen, Norplant Under Siege, THE RECORD,
Aug. 28, 1995, at B1 (discussing report which shows that majority of Norplant users are satis-
fied despite most having suffered at least one side effect and also stating that some complaints
filed by lawyers have been "carbon copies of one another, right down to typographical errors").
5. Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 30, 1995, at 50 (describing how contingency fee system has created "powerful incentive"
for lawyers to commit wide range of abuses, e.g., bribery, fraud, and charging risk-based fees
when there is no risk of nonrecovery).
6. See ABC News Special: The Trouble With Lawyers (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 2,
1996) (giving examples of how plaintiff lawyers are enriching themselves by filing unmeritori-
ous class action suits against defendants who are willing to settle to avoid larger litigation
costs, and further indicating that although lawyers earn tremendous fees, their clients often see
little return and sometimes end up worse off). The program also presented Professor John
Langbein who remarked: "This is not far removed from what Al Capone used to do to shop-
keepers on the west side of Chicago .... It's extortion." Id.; see also John Stossel, Protect
Us from Legal Vultures, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at 8 (previewing ABC News Special,
supra); 60 Minutes: Women At Risk (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 22, 1995) (discussing how
breast implant litigation has less to do with scientific causation than with lawyers' fees and
suggesting that plaintiffs experts' testimony may be significantly influenced by fees).
7. LESTER BRICKMAN Er AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES (1994).
8. See Peter Passell, Windfall Fees in Injury Cases Under Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 1994, at Al.
9. The basic elements of the proposal were first endorsed by a group of distinguished
academics, practicing attorneys, and former government officials including: Morris Abram,
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legislatures, ° and a version appeared on the March 1996 California ballot."
William Barr, Ronald Beard, Derek Bok, Robert Bork, Samuel Butler, Edward Costykian,
Robert Cramton, Norman Dorsen, Tyrone Fahner, Thomas Gee, Walter Gellhorn, Mary Ann
Glendon, Erwin Griswold, Charles Horsky, Rex Lee, Thomas Morgan, John Noonan,
Theodore Olson, Robert O'Neil, Shirley Peterson, Robert Pitofsky, George Priest, Leon
Silverman, and Harry Wellington. Editorial columns and editorials supporting the proposal
have appeared in more than 40 newspapers across the country and elsewhere. See, e.g., Joe
M. Dove, Contingency Fees "Unethical Windfall" for Some Lawyers, THE CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), Jan. 22, 1995, at Cl; David Foppert, Putting Contingency Fees On Trial,
BEST'S REvIEw - PROP./CASUALTY INS. EDITION, July 1994, at 38; Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr.,
Fact And Comment, FORBES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 23; Brent Larkin, Reformers Target Lawyers'
Fees, CLEv. PLAIN-DEALER, Feb. 27, 1994, at 1C; Anthony Lewis, Make Haste Slowly, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1995, at A17; Margot Norman, Thin Cases, Fat Fees: Why Are We Importing
the Worst of US Justice?, TIMES (London), May 17, 1994, at 14; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Taking
Leave: Making Litigation Not Pay, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 13, 1995, at 27; see also Editorial,
Capping Contingency Fees, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 8, 1994, at B6; Editorial, Place Some
Limits on Contingency Fees, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 8, 1994, at B10; Editorial, Review
& Outlook: Taming Runaway Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1995, at A22; Editorial,
Streamlining Civil Litigation, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1995, at A18.
Paul Crotty, Corporation Counsel for New York City, has recently urged the New York
Court of Appeals to adopt the proposal as a court rule for three reasons: "lower overhead,
smoother proceedings in cases that do not settle, and a reduced total payout, with a greater
amount of money going to the injured party." Letter from Paul A. Crotty, Corporation
Counsel for the City of New York, to Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, New York Court of
Appeals 5 (Jan. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
10. A Michigan Senate bill, S. 344, 88th Leg., introduced on February 28, 1995, was
referred to the Michigan Committee on Economic Development, International Trade and
Regulatory Affairs, where it was amended to include the "early offer" proposal on May 10,
1995 and subsequently approved by the Michigan Senate on that same date. See MICHIGAN
SENATE JOURNAL 862-63 (1995). The "early offer" amendment was not reported out by the
Michigan House of Representatives and was not included in the bill that was signed by the
Governor on December 25, 1995. Interest in the proposal remains high and the legislative
sponsors of the proposal are considering re-introducing the bill in the near future.
11. On December 20, 1994, a modestly altered version of the proposal was filed with
the California Attorney-General by an alliance of consumer activists and businessmen for the
purpose of qualifying it as a 1996 initiative. It qualified as Proposition 202 and appeared on
the March 1996 ballot. Proposition 202 was defeated by a 51% to 49% margin. See Dan
Bernstein, More Legal Reform Votes?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28, 1996, at A16. The
alliance was led by Silicon Valley businessman Thomas Proulx, insurance industry critic and
author Andrew Tobias, and remarkably, Voter Revolt, the Nader-affiliated consumer group
that sponsored California Proposition 103 mandating sharp automobile insurance rate reduction.
See Dan Morain, 1996 Expected to Be Boom Year for Initiatives, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1995,
at Al. In 1988, Voter Revolt had successfully opposed California Proposition 106, which
sought to limit attorney fees, but its political director, Bill Zimmerman, distinguished the
proposal from Proposition 202 as follows:
mhe attorhiey fee limits in Proposition 106 were too severe. Attorneys would have
refused to take cases under that system which would have limited access to justice for
too many legitimate clients. Thuis proposal] is a progressive, pro-consumer measure.
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The proposal was also introduced in the U.S. Senate," where hearings have
been held on contingency fee abuses.
13
The American Bar Association (ABA) has also taken note of the in-
creased public concern. A plenary session of a recent National Conference
on Professional Responsibility was devoted to "a debate regarding the call
to rethink contingency fees."' 4 Perhaps the most significant step taken by
the ABA has been to respond to a request from a group of practitioners,
educators, and scholars for ethical guidance regarding the use of standard
contingency fees.' In its response, 6 the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility (the Committee) essentially absolved contin-
gency fee lawyers from any meaningful ethical mandates pertaining to fees,
holding that charging standard and substantial contingency fees is not
inappropriate in cases that do not include an issue of liability and in which
substantial settlement offers prior to the rendering of any significant ser-"
vices are almost certain. 17 While elevating the financial interests of lawyers
Alliance to Revitalize California, Two Initiatives Filed to Unclog Courts and Lower Auto
Insurance Rates 3 (Dec. 20, 1994) (unpublished press release draft on file with author)
(emphasis added). Several articles discuss the initiative and two others qualified by the
Alliance. See Lester Brickman, Curb Legal Feeding Frenzy, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 1996,
at 1 lA; Robert Stowe England, Ambulance Chaser Alert Next March, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 10,
1995, at 28; Christopher John Farley, Fed Up with Lawyers, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 36; Tim
W. Ferguson, Tort Retort, FORBES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 47; Margaret A. Jacobs, Business
Groups, Lawyers Face Off Over California Litigation Reform, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1996,
at B5; Peter Passell, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at D2; Stuart Taylor,
Tort Lawyers vs. Consumers, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1996, at 23.
12. Lawsuit Reform Act of 1995, S. 300, 104th Cong. (1995).
13. See Contingency Fee Hearings, supra note 1.
14. See ABA, 21st National Conference on Professional Responsibility, San Diego,
Cal. (June 1-3, 1995). The title of the session may have revealed more of their views than
the conference organizers intended. While the subtitle read: "A debate regarding the call
to rethink contingency fees," the title read: "Contingency Fees: Is One Third Of A Loaf
Better Than None?"
15. See Letter to the Chair of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility 1 (Feb. 10, 1994) (on file with author). The signatories of the letter were:
Morris Abram, William Barr, Ronald Beard, Robert Bork, Lester Brickman, Samuel Butler,
Edward Costikyan, Roger Crampton, Norman Dorsen, Tyron Fahner, Thomas Gee, Walter
Gellhorn, Mary Ann Glendon, Erwin Griswold, Michael Horowitz, Charles Horsky, Rex
Lee, Thomas Morgan, Jeffrey O'Connell, Theodore Olson, Robert O'Neil, Shirley Peterson,
Robert Pitofsky, George Priest, Leon Silverman, and Harry Wellington. Id. at 18.
16. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389 (1994),
reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1001:248 (1995)
[hereinafter Formal Opinion 94-389].
17. See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics
Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 290-95 (1996).
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over those of clients and the public," the ABA Committee did acknowledge
that although charging standard contingency fee rates was virtually always
ethically permissible, such charges had to be "reasonable." 9
To many, the recital of the "reasonable fee" mantra no doubt appears
to be responsive to the considerable evidence of abusive fee practices. On
closer analysis, however, the reasonable fee declaration is an essentially
ritualistic incantation designed to give an appearance of effective disciplin-
ary enforcement of ethics rules, but in reality, is devoid of substance. In
fact, the reasonable fee invocation is nothing more than a ringing endorse-
ment of the status quo,2' in which lawyers routinely charge and obtain
18. See id.
19. Formal Opinion 94-389, supra note 16, at 1001:249. See the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1995) for the reasonableness requirement. For its
analogue, see the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1986).
The Model Code states: "A Lawyer shall not ... charge ... an ... excessive fee." Id.
20. The reasonable fee mantra has been used to justify the rejection of a per se ban
on nonrefundable retainers. The argument advanced is that lawyers charging unethical
nonrefundable retainers can instead be disciplined for breaching the codes by charging
unreasonable and unethical fees; hence there is no need for a per se ban. The argument fails
for at least two reasons. First, as with contingency fees, there is virtually no enforcement
of the requirement that fees be reasonable and not excessive. As a colleague and I have
previously noted:
[R]elying on the ban on excessive and unreasonable fees is, in reality, full
toleration of nonrefundable retainers. Consider reality. Before Cooperman, no
prosecutions of the use of nonrefundable retainers under DR 2-106 or Rule 1.5
had been brought. Further, Cooperman itself was brought not on the theory that
the lawyer had charged an excessive fee, but on the grounds that nonrefundable
retainers are per se unethical. Moreover, Cooperman was not brought until we
had supplied the intellectual architecture needed to construct the ban. In short,
the ban on excessive and unreasonable fees offers not even the slenderest hope
of deterring the egregious fee abuses that congregate under the nonrefundable
retainer banner.
Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to
Critics of the Absolute Ban, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 11, 37-38 (1995) (citation omitted). A
second reason why the argument fails is that it does not accord with fiduciary law or
relevant public policy. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Respondent-Appellant's
Appeal, In Re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994) (No. 25), reprinted in 64 U. CIN.
L. REv. 11, app. A at 57-58 (1995).
21. When lawyers who oppose any tort reform that would reduce their incomes,
regardless of the merits, congregate under the banner of "reasonable fees," caution is
advised. When both plaintiff and defendant lawyers do so, then George Bernard Shaw's
words of wisdom that "professions are conspiracies against the laity," ring especially true:
It is therefore noteworthy that the plaintiffs' bar is in total agreement with the ABA that the
appropriately sufficient ethical response to contingency fee abuses is to prosecute those who
charge unreasonable and excessive fees. In an initiative sponsored by the California trial
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substantial and sometimes enormous windfall fees in cases without risk.
These fees can easily amount to thousands and even tens of thousands of
dollars per hour.'
The ABA Committee's claim that it is indeed enforcing ethical standards
by invoking the reasonable fee standard is based on the following syllogism:
Lawyers who charge "unreasonable" contingency fees violate the ethics
codes. Violations of the ethics codes result in disciplinary sanctions.
Therefore, in the world of the ABA, contingency fee lawyers are subject
to ethical constraints. However, there is a critical flaw in the syllogism.
Contingency fee lawyers are virtually never disciplined for charging unrea-
sonable fees, that is, for charging substantial risk premiums in cases without
meaningful risk.' Presumably the ABA must know that there are virtually
lawyers, titled "Frivolous Lawsuit Limitation Act," certified to appear on the November
1996 California ballot, the trial lawyers decry the charging of excessive fees and provide
for "relief from excessive attorneys' fees." Cal. Prop. 207 § 5 (1996). After reading the
initiative, few can doubt the assertion that "limiting fees" to "reasonable" and "not excessive
fees" is simply a subterfuge to confuse the public into thinking that meaningful ethical
constraints are being called for when in fact the status quo is being maintained. This trial
lawyer initiative was intended to reverse the expected passage of the "early offer" initiative
that appeared on the March 1996 California ballot to limit contingency fees in cases when
early settlement offers are made. An outpouring of trial lawyer money led to the defeat,
in a close vote, of the early offer initiative. See supra note 11 (discussing Proposition 202).
If the trial lawyer initiative is passed, its only effect now will be to preclude the California
legislature from enacting laws to regulate lawyer fees.
22. See Brickman, On the Relevance of Admissibility, supra note 3, at 1773; see also
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 77 n.186 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Contingent Fees].
Illustrative examples of ethically impermissible rates of return abound. See, e.g., Peter
PasselI, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6 (discussing settlements resulting from Phillips Petroleum case
that yielded law firm "$65 million fee [which] translates into almost $20,000 an hour, a
windfall in a case where tens of millions in compensation was a foregone conclusion");
James Pinkerton, The Spoils of Tragedy; Profiting on Disaster, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 2,
1992, at Al (describing Texas school bus disaster settlement that yielded contingency fee
conservatively estimated to be $25,000-$35,000 per hour despite notable fact that most
attorneys who reaped these riches did not participate in settlement process, nor did they
engage in significant preparatory work for trial because issue of liability was clear-cut and
likelihood of very substantial settlement was overwhelming); Dee Ralles, $84.5 Million
Offered in Tainted Water Case, ARiz. REPUBuC, Feb. 26, 1991, at Al (discussing settlement
that yielded $33.8 million in attorneys fees, suggesting rates of return in excess of $30,000
per hour).
23. See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETincs: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR (1966" (presenting broader critique of ABA enforcement of disciplinary rules); David
0. Burbank & Robert S. Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston
Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 66, 91-93 (1974); F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart,
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no disciplinary sanctions applied to contingency fee lawyers for charging
unreasonable fees. Thus, the ethical standards of the ABA itself could
properly be questioned.24 Moreover,, the stratagem of relying on disciplin-
ary sanctions to conceal the core position of the ABA - a resounding
endorsement of the status quo - would be stripped of its stealth sheathing,
exposing in the raw an underlying financial self-interest.
If this were so, we would expect that the plaintiffs' bar would have
adopted a similar stratagem because the financial interests of defense
lawyers, predominantly represented by the ABA, and the financial interests
of plaintiff contingency fee lawyers coincide.' Indeed, the plaintiffs' bar
has done so. The stratagem is frequently referred to as the "case-by-case
approach." Under this approach, if there are violations of the ethical
mandate that contingency fees be reasonable, then these should be prose-
cuted in the disciplinary system on a case-by-case basis.' Therefore, there
is no need for any systemic reform of contingency fee abuses.
To unmask the ABA's position on the application of ethical constraints
on contingency fees, I have undertaken to determine the efficacy of the
case-by-case approach to enforcement of ethics rules violations regarding
contingency fees. To that end, I have surveyed those who administer the
disciplinary system - state bar counsel - to determine what they regard
as violations of the ethics codes and how they respond to such violations.
This Article presents the results of that survey. To place the survey in
coAtext, I begin with a brief analysis of the ethical rules regulating contin-
gency fees, the various methods of enforcement of those rules proffered by
the bar, and the efficacy of those methods.
L Ethical Mandates Governing Contingency Fees
Contingency fees are a system for financing tort litigation that enables
injured persons to gain access to the legal system when they would not
Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 214-
19 (same); see also ABA CTR. FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDING COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLjNE, 1990 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (1992) (provid-
ing statistical evidence demonstrating lack of enforcement).
24. Indeed, I have questioned the ABA's ethical standards elsewhere. See Brickman,
supra note 17, at 250-56.
25. See id. at n.31 (presenting exposition of commonality of interest of plaintiff
and defense lawyers in maintaining high contingency fees and therefore high litigation
levels).
26. See Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse
Door, 2 LITIG., Summer 1976, at 27.
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otherwise be able to do so. Lawyers assume the risk of receiving no fee
or a low fee in exchange for a share of any recovery, generally ranging
from 33% to 50%.1 In exchange for bearing such risk, "lawyers charge
a premium ... [which] compensates for the risk of nonpayment if the suit
does not succeed .... n
Effective hourly rates received by lawyers charging contingency fees are
usually higher than normal hourly rate charges.29 To justify these higher
fees, that is, to meet the ethics codes' requirements that fees be reasonable
and not clearly excessive,30 "[c]ourts in general have insisted that a contin-
gent fee be truly contingent. The typically elevated fee reflecting the risk
to the lawyer of receiving no fee will be permitted only if the representation
indeed involves a significant degree of risk."3' Indeed, the ethics codes
mandate that contingency fees are legitimate only when there is an assump-
tion of meaningful risk. Model Rule 1.5(a)(8) and Model Code DR2-
106(B)(8) provide that one of the factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of a fee is "whether the fee is fixed or contingent." This
factor can be read literally to mean that simply calling a fee contingent
thereby entitles a lawyer to charge a higher fee - but to do so would be
wrong. However self-serving the codes may be,32 they should not be
interpreted with such utter cynicism and total disdain for the profession's
responsibility "to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public
interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the
bar."" The obvious intent of the drafters was to allow lawyers ethically to
charge a higher fee provided that they were bearing a meaningful fee risk.
The codes are correctly read to mean that a contingent fee must be more
than just contingent in name - it must be contingent in fact.'
27. See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 49 n.3.
28. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
735-36 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting on other grounds).
29. Contingent fees usually produce a higher fee than a fixed or hourly fee would for
the same service. See Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Case 149, 2 W.VA. ST. BAR
NEWS 75 (1961), noted in MARu & CLOUGH, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPIN-
IONS, No. 4711, at 516 (1970). Maru and Clough comment that "[w]here no agreement
exists with regard to a fee, it is proper to charge only a reasonable fee, which will ordinarily
be less than a fee fixed on a contingent basis." Id.
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-106(A) (1986); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1995).
31. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.4, at 532 (1986).
32. See Brickman, supra note 17, at 250-59.
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, preamble (1995).
34. The codes also mandate that contingency fees only be charged when they are
1347
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339 (1996)
Although most tort claims involve risk that justifies the charging of risk
premiums, that is, standard contingency fees, a significant fraction of claims
involve no meaningful risk. Because of the severity of injury, the absence
of any issue of liability, and the existence of insurance, lawyers represent-
ing such claimants often anticipate at the time of undertaking the representa-
tion that substantial settlement offers will be made without the need for any
significant expenditure of time. Nonetheless, most lawyers charge standard
and substantial contingency fees ranging from 33 % to 50% in such cases.
As former Harvard President and Law School Dean Derek Bok has ob-
served:
Most plaintiffs do not know whether they have a strong case, and rare is
the lawyer who will inform them (and agree to a lower percentage of the
take) when they happen to have an extremely high probability of win-
ning. In most instances, therefore, the contingent fee is a standard rate
that seldom varies with the size of a likely settlement or the odds of pre-
vailing in court.
36
It is beyond dispute that the charging of standard and substantial contin-
gency fees in all cases violates the codes' mandates that fees be reasonable
and that contingency fees are justified only when there is commensurate
risk.37 These routine violations of ethical mandates occur because of the
enormous windfall fees generated. The lure of easy money in cases with
"clear liability and high return" is overpowering. The principal challenge
facing those who would apply ethical mandates to contingency fees is to
devise a way to distinguish between cases in which there is meaningful
beneficial to the client. See Brickman, supra note 17, at 316 app. B. Appendix B is titled:
An Ethical Alternative to ABA Formal Opinion 44-389 on Contingency Fees.
35. See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 49 n.3.
36. DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE
PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA 140 (1993).
37. Incredibly, even as the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility opined that lawyers could charge contingency fees without regard to risk, see
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text, the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA)
was holding forth that contingency fees ought to be commensurate to risk. Thus,-ATLA
"publicly urge[d] its members to 'exercise sound judgment in using a percentage in the
contingent fee contract that is commensurate with the risk, cost, and effort required."'
AMERCAN TRIAL LAwYERS ASS'N, KEYS TO THE COURTHOUSE: QUICK FACTS ON THE
CONTINGENT FEE SYSTEM 4 (1994).
38. See Andrew Blum, Big Bucks, But... Cash Flow a Problem, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
3, 1989, at 1, 47 (providing interviews with five high-income-earning personal injury
attorneys which revealed agreement that "there are ... good PI cases - with clear liability
and high return .... [generating] quick and easy money").
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risk - because liability or the level of damages is seriously contested -
and those in which meaningful risk is absent.
II. Methods of Enforcing Ethical Mandates
Governing Contingency Fees
Four methods have been proffered to deal with the problem of violations
of ethical mandates regulating contingency fees. One method is to set limits
on lawyers' contingency fees.39 These fee caps have come into wide use,
especially with regard to medical malpractice litigation.' Although the
main purpose of fee caps is to diminish the amount of litigation,4 an
auxiliary purpose is to prohibit lawyers from charging excessive fees.42
However, fee caps do not discriminate between claims subject to serious
risks of low recovery and nonrecovery and those claims in which fee caps
do not appreciably reduce the incidence of windfall fees.
A second method of enforcement of ethical mandates is "judicial scru-
tiny, where necessary, on a case-by-case basis."'43 This is the method
advocated by Philip H. Corboy, a leading torts practitioner.' Those who
call for judicial scrutiny of contingency fees as a principal form of enforce-
ment of ethical mandates, however, face an overwhelming task. Each year,
approximately one million new contingency fee cases are filed.45 Many
39. See BRicKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
40. For a list of medical malpractice fee caps, see Richard M. Bimholz, Comment,
The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 950 n.6
(1990).
41. See Patricia M. Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14 BELL
J. ECON. 213, 222 (1984) ("The reduction in expected payoff will reduce the number of
claims filed.").
, 42. See Corboy, supra note 26, at 36 (advocating schedule of permissible contingency
fee rates as solution to lawyer overcharging).
43. Id. at 35.
44. Mr. Corboy's "judicial scrutiny," however, appears to be a disguised version of
the fee cap. In addition to other measures, Corboy suggests that "the profession should...
adopt a schedule of percentage-based contingent fees." Id. at 36.
45. The one million figure is a conservative approximation based on recent compila-
tions and reports of tort cases filed in federal and state courts. Although the vast majority
of tort cases are filed in state courts, there is no nationwide compilation of state tort case
filings. To arrive at the approximation therefore requires some statistical estimation. For
example, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) reported 592,425 state tort case
filings in 1993 based on data collected from only 32 state courts and the District of Colum-
bia and Puerto Rico. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATIsTICs: ANNUAL REPORT 1993, at 196-98 (1995). Tort caseload statistics from the
following states were not included in NCSC's study: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
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more representations on a contingency fee basis take place outside of
courts. It would be a physical impossibility for courts to scrutinize even a
small percentage of these cases on an ex ante basis to determine whether
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Further, the filing data did not include medical malpractice and product liability cases filed
in California, and was underinclusive for many of the other states. See id. at 198. If we
assume that the number of filings in each of the 18 states excluded from the NCSC study
is equal to the mean number of reported filings, 17,424 (592,425 + 34), then the total
number of state court tort filings for 1993 would be 906,057 (17,424 x 18 + 592,425). The
number of tort cases in federal courts in 1993 was 43,259. See Editorial, Tort's Collateral
Damages, INV. Bus. DAILY, Mar. 31, 1995, at A2 (citing Federal Judicial Center data).
The estimate of one million tort filings is certainly "in the ballpark" based on the federal
data and the incomplete and underinclusive state data referenced above.
Another method of estimating the number of annual state tort filings nationwide is to
extrapolate from data comparing the number of state tort filings to the number of state civil
filings. In 1989, the NCSC reported 17,321,125 state civil filings. See NATIONAL CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1989, at 4
(1991), cited in Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System -Aid Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1205 & n.187 (1992). While
torts constituted less than 5% of state civil filings in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North
Dakota, and Utah from 1984 to 1989, the percentage ranged from 26% to 31% in Maine
and from 27% to 30% in New York during the same period. Saks, supra, at 1208 & n.201.
Assuming that 8% of the civil cases filed in 1989 were tort cases, the number of state tort
filings in 1989 would have been 1.38 million. This percentage seems to be a reasonable
estimate in light of the NCSC's 1990 report that state tort filings represented 10% of 18.4
million state civil cases filings, or 1.84 million filings. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1990, at 18 (1992), cited
in Randall Samborn, State Cout Filings Hit New Highs, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 7.
Even if the percentage of state tort filings is actually somewhat lower than 8%, the total
number of state tort cases filed today would probably still exceed one million because the
number of civil cases filed in state courts has risen since 1989. See Brian Cummings, Study
Finds Down-Trend in State Tort Filings, CH. DAILY L. BULL., May 12, 1995, at 1 (indicat-
ing that "nearly 20 million" civil cases were filed in state courts in 1993). The Rand
Institute for Civil Justice estimated that "of 89 million cases filed in the state courts in 1993,
about 1.5 percent were tort - or - injury cases." Claire Cooper, Few Injured Americans
Sue, Study Concludes, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 28, 1995, at N10. This estimate would
produce a figure of 1.335 million state court tort filings.
The assertion that at least approximately one million tort cases are filed annually
nationwide is supported by additional reports. According to the Rand Institute for Civil
Justice, 911,000 tort suits were filed in federal and state courts in 1985. See J. KAKALIK
& N. PACE, COSTS OF COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986), cited in P.S.
Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J.
1002, 1009 n.31. Further, the NCSC estimated that 1.155 million tort cases were filed in
1991. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS
ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 19 (1993), cited in Randall Samborn, In Courts: Caseloads Still
Rise, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1993, at 10.
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there was meaningful risk at the time of entering into the fee contract that
would have justified the charging of a standard contingency fee. Moreover,
even if courts were to seek to take on some responsibility in this area by
selecting the most egregious instances of overreaching, how would they
know which cases to select for further inquiry?' Virtually all tort-related
contingency fees today range from 25% to 50%; other than in class actions,
aggregations, and claims on behalf of minors where fees are fixed by the
courts, contingency fee rates seldom amount to less than 33 % of recoveries
when cases are settled without trial, 40% if cases go to trial, and 50% if
appeals are necessary to sustain the judgments.47 Because contingency fees
have thus become standardized, clients who have been charged substantial
risk premiums in cases in which the lawyer assumed no meaningful risk
have no basis to conclude that they have been mulcted; hence, they perceive
no basis on which to file a fee complaint.'
The daunting task faced by courts has resulted in a virtual total abdica-
tion of the role of courts in policing contingency fee abuses.49 Instead,
case-by-case enforcement by the judiciary has become a pseudonym for the
status quo: there is virtually no enforcement of DR 2-106(A) and Model
Rule 1.5(a) against contingency fee lawyers grossly overcharging clients in
cases in which liability is clear and known to be so at the outset and in
46. See Corboy, supra note 42, at 35 (asking how judges would know "where [it was]
necessary").
47. See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 13 n.3.
48. See Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDozo
L. REv. 1417, 1429-30 nn.72-73 (1991).
49. Judicial scrutiny had been an essential feature of the process of legitimation of
contingency fees. Thus, Canon 13 of the first ABA code of ethics, adopted August 27,
1908, provided: "Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under supervision
of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges." 33 REPORTS OF
AMEuCAN BAR AssOCIATION (1908). As amended on August 31, 1933, the Canon read in
pertinent part: "A contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reason-
able under all circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensa-
tion, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court as to its reasonableness."
58 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1908).
From the very beginning of their use, courts have pronounced with great frequency
that contingency fees require "special scrutiny" because of the danger of overreaching. For
a listing of cases so providing see Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 22, at 137 nn.96-
97.
Despite these repeated incantations, with the exception of class actions, judicial
scrutiny of contingency fees today - in an era when a million or more contingency fee
cases are filed annually - is receding to the point of irrelevance. The occasional utterance
is more than blotted out by the resounding silence.
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which a substantial insurance payment or at least a minimum anticipated
sum is likely to be tendered with little or no work by the lawyer.
The third method is one adopted by the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility in response to a rdquest for ethical
guidance relating to charging standard contingency fees in the absence of
assumption of any realistic fee risk (Formal Opinion 94-389).' In addition
to invoking the reasonable fee mantra and effecively condoning and justify-
ing the current practice of charging standard contingency fees in cases with
high reward and little or no meaningful risk, the Committee did acknowl-
edge one additional duty of the lawyer: to discuss "the nature (and details)
of the [contingency fee] compensation agreement . .. [with the] client
before any final agreement is reached."5'
50. See Formal Opinion 94-389, supra note 16, at 1001:250-51; see also supra notes
15-19.
51. See Formal Opinion 94-389, supra note 16, at 1001:251. The ABA further
provides:
The extent of the discussion, of course, will depend on whether it is the
lawyer or the client who initiated the idea of proceeding with the contingent fee
arrangement, the lawyer's prior dealings with the client (including whether there
has been any prior contingent fee arrangement), and the experience and sophisti-
cation of the client with respect to litigation and other legal matters. Among the
factors that should be considered and discussed are the following:
a. The likelihood of success;
b. The likely amount of recovery or savings, if the case is successful;
c. The possibility of an award of exemplary or multiple damages and how
that will affect the fee;
d. The attitude and prior practices of the other side with respect to settle-
ment;
e. The likelihood of, or any anticipated difficulties in, collecting any judg-
ment;
f. The availability of alternative dispute resolution as a means of achieving
an earlier conclusion to the matter;
g. The amount of time that is likely to be invested by the lawyer;
h. The likely amount of the fee if the matter is handled on a non-contingent
basis;
i. The client's ability and willingness to pay a non-contingent fee;
j. The percentage of any recovery that the lawyer would receive as a
contingent fee and whether that percentage will be fixed or on a sliding
scale;
k. Whether the lawyer's fees would be recoverable by the client by reason
of statute or common law rule;
1. Whether the jurisdiction in which the claim will be pursued has any rules
or guidelines for contingent fees; and
m, How expenses of the litigation are to be handled.
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Because the factors to be discussed with the client before there is a fee
agreement include the degree of risk that the lawyer will assume,52 it may
be thought that the Committee sought to alter the status quo somewhat. As
indicated earlier, however, contingency fee lawyers generally do not dis-
close to clients when meaningful risk is absent and substantial rewards are
highly probable; moreover, clients generally have no independent basis for
assessing risk, 3 and are rarely in a position to bargain over fees.' In addi-
tion, any attempt at bargaining is easily squelched by the valid but inten-
tionally misleading assertions that contingency fees are standard throughout
the community and that because all lawyers charge the same percentage,
then the fee must necessarily be fair.5
On closer analysis, therefore, the Committee's admonition amounts to
mere lip service to the concept of the client giving her informed consent to
the fee structure. 6 With Formal Opinion 94-389, the Committee did not
intend to change, nor will the opinion change, the current practice of con-
tingency fee lawyers charging windfall fees and taking advantage of clients'
lack of knowledge of risk.
The key to understanding the strategy behind the drafting of' Formal
Opinion 94-389 - that is, of appearing to advance an ethical admonition
while in fact endorsing the status quo - lies in focusing on how the bar
will enforce the lawyer's obligation to "consider and discuss" the risk
factors before entering into a fee agreement. It is the Committee's position
that a lawyer, who according to the ethics code is "in a better position to
evaluate a cause of action,"' will have fulfilled her ethical obligation by
"explain[ing] a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation,"58 including infor-
mation about risk as it relates to the fee structure, through ex parte dialogue
with a generally unsophisticated client often rendered vulnerable and de-
pendent by the traumatic effects of an injury or illness.59 How would a fail-
52. Factors a and g and to a lesser extent, factors b, c, and d relate to the risk
assumed by the lawyer. Id.
53. See BOK, supra note 36, at 140.
54. See infra note 59.
55. See Brickman, supra note 48, at 1429-30.
56. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 22, at 49-54, 70-74 (developing
fiduciary concept of informed consent as it relates to fee bargain).
57. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-7 (1986).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1995).
59. See Burger Urges Limits on Lawyer Fees in Personal Injury Cases, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 14, 1986, at 17. Chief Justice Burger stated:
It is becoming more and more clear that in multiple disaster cases . . . . the
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ure to fulfill this obligation be detected? There is no paper trail to which
to point. Moreover, how will clients know that they have a right to the
information required to be disclosed, and if clients do not know, then how
will they know that the attorneys have deprived them of this information?
Even if clients were somehow to learn that their attorney had mulcted
them by charging a standard contingency fee in a case devoid of both risk
and any communication thereof to the client, there is little that clients could
do. A complaint to a disciplinary agency would have little chance of
success. As elaborated below, many disciplinary agencies do not accept
jurisdiction over claims of excessive fees,' and instead relegate them to fee
arbitration where arbitrators may disregard violations of ethics rules.61
Furthermore, most disciplinary gencies do not regard the failure to discuss
the thirteen factors listed in Formal Opinion 94-389 with the client before
entering into a contingency fee agreement as a violation of ethics rules.
This conclusion applies with particular force to a failure to discuss the risk
factors. Indeed, even when clients initiate complaints against contingency
fee lawyers and allege fee abuses, these complaints almost never result in
disciplinary action against the lawyers2
Nonetheless, the fourth method advanced by those claiming that ethical
mandates are in fact applied to contingency fee abuses is reliance on disci-
plinary authorities to pursue violations of the Model Rules and the Model
Code. It may appear that reliance on case-by-case enforcement is more
rational because it involves a resort to an extant disciplinary mechanism and
because bar counsel are the frontline troops in policing ethical abuses and
therefore should be less reticent than courts to initiate disciplinary proceed-
ings. Here too, however, case-by-case enforcement fails for many of the
same reasons that judicial enforcement fails. Clients who are charged
standard contingency fees in cases in which the lawyer has borne no mean-
transaction between an experienced lawyer and inexperienced lay survivors in
negotiating a contract for professional services is not an arms-length transac-
tion .... Many adults, injured persons or survivors of deceased persons, are
no more capable of making a valid judgment on the appropriateness of the valid
fee contract of 33 or 40 or 50 percent than a 12-year old child.
Id.
60. Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV 665, 714
(1994) ("Most bar disciplinary systems decline jurisdiction over fee-related disputes.").
61. See Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990
UTAH L. REV. 277, 299-302; see also Margaret Jacobs, Often, Fee Arbitration Isn't Such
a Panacea, Especially for Clients, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at BlI.
62. See infra Part I.
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ingful risk are not aware of the overcharging - even gross overcharging.
Hence, the clients do not come forward and file complaints.
Even when clients do come forward, as indicated in Part II, they are
virtually never successful. Moreover, although disciplinary agencies have
the authority to act sua sponte and sometimes do, they almost never initiate
actions charging violations of ethical rules that require risk as the basis for
charging a substantial risk premium. This inaction results because disci-
plinary agencies typically do not regard lawyers who charge clients standard
contingency fees in the absence of assuming meaningful fee risk as violating
the ethics codes. This is true even if the overcharge is massive, as is the
case when a lawyer knows in advance that an insurance company will
almost certainly tender payment near or at the policy limits and that the
case requires very little work. As counsel for a disciplinary agency re-
cently observed in referring to such circumstances in which a one-third fee
was charged: "The percentages provided in the agreement do not appear to
be outside the range of contingency fees charged generally in such matters
in this jurisdiction and thus do not present an issue of excessive recovery
under our ethical rules. 63
This bar counsel effectively deleted the risk requirement in contingency
fees from the ethics rules. Other bar counsel indicated they were of like
mind. One noted: "The two most relevant facts are: (1) a contingency fee
agreement was entered into and (2) grievant accepted settlement offer." '
Not only do bar counsel ordinarily view standard contingency fees as
insulated from ethical restraints, many also view complaints about fees not
as issues of ethics, but rather as fee disputes - tar babies that they seek to
divert to fee dispute mechanisms such as fee arbitration.'
For these reasons, even when clients initiate complaints alleging fee
abuses against contingency fee lawyers, these complaints virtually never
result in disciplinary action being taken against the lawyer. Even a jury
63. Statement of a surveyed bar counsel, kept on file with the author [hereinafter Bar
Counsel Statement]. To preserve the anonymity of the various bar counsel, any references
to the bar counsel statements will cite to the generic "Bar Counsel Statement" for support,
see infra text accompanying and following notes 75-77.
Some bar counsel view the four comers of the fee agreement as controlling and will not
take cognizance of ethical violations in a contingency fee contract entered into between the
parties: "Unless there were some unusual circumstances we would not go behind the contract
signed by the client." Bar Counsel Statement. "[I]f that rule [(the state statute requiring
contingency fee agreements to be in writing)] is satisfied, contract law would probably
require enforcement of the contract and a disciplinary outcome is very unlikely." Bar
Counsel Statement.
64. Bar Counsel Statement.
65. See infra Part VII.A.
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finding that a lawyer failed to disclose to a contingency fee client that the
case would likely be settled for policy limits with little effort and that
charging a standard contingency fee under such circumstances violated the
lawyer's fiduciary obligation to the client has been found to be an insuffi-
cient basis for public sanction. 6
Overwhelmingly, bar counsel not only totally disregard the ethics codes'
requirements that the lawyer must be exposed to a fee risk in order to
justify charging the substantial risk premium embedded in a standard
contingency fee agreement, they additionally disregard the ABA Standing
Committee's admonition that the lawyer discuss risk factors before entering
the fee agreement. Thus, one bar counsel volunteered:
66. In Richfield v. Heuser and Carr, a Colorado law firm was sued by its former client
because of an improper contingency fee representation. Richfield v. Heuser and Carr, No.
92 CV 1797, slip op. at 1 (Dist. Court, El Paso County, Colo., Div. 1, Jan. 13, 1994). The
firm was required to return the contingency fee that it had retained from a settlement and was
further barred from obtaining the reasonable value of its services after a jury found that the
attorney "did not disclose to the plaintiff all of the facts of which they were aware which
they knew or should have known would influence the plaintiff.., to sign the [contingent
fee] agreement. . . ." Id.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and while in the hospital entered into
a contingency fee agreement with the defendant which provided that the law firm would
receive one-third of any recovery obtained. Id. The plaintiff remained hospitalized for two
weeks and incurred nearly $12,000 in medical expenses. Id. at 2. Shortly thereafter it was
discovered that the responsible party's insurance policy coverage was limited to $25,000.
Id. Before a lawsuit was filed against the insured and within four months of the accident,
the insurance company agreed to pay the plaintiff $25,000. Id. at 3. The attorney retained
$8,333.33 as his one-third contingent fee. Id. at 1.
The plaintiff contended that this fee was excessive because the attorney had failed to
disciose the following information to her prior to signing the contingent fee agreement:
(1) settlement without trial was a probability and would require little effort or legal skill;
(2) processing the claim and obtaining a recovery would be accomplished essentially by
clerical staff; and (3) the attorney would not know at the time of contracting whether a
standard one-third contingency fee was fair or excessive, or whether some other fee arrange-
ment would be preferable. Id. The jury found that the attorney had an obligation to make
such disclosures before entering the fee arrangement, and because he breached that obligation,
the attorney was not entitled to his contracted fee. Id. at 2-3. Based on the attorney's
testimony that he personally worked on the case "in the ballpark of 15 hours," the jury found
that the reasonable value of the attorney's services was $2250 (15 hours at $150 per hour).
Id. at 3. The judge found this testimony "incredible," stating that "[i]t is difficult to imagine
how a lawyer could spend 15 hours on a case such as this." Id. However, rather than adjust
the quantum meruit award, the judge held that the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty was
"serious" and "egregious" and that the contingency fee was a "gross overcharge," and there-
dfore ordered the attorney to forfeit "all fees in connection with the case." Id. at 5.
These facts were brought to the attention of the Colorado Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
which declined to institute disciplinary proceedings. (Letters on file with author.)
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The fact (if established) that the attorney did little or no work to "earn"
the fee would carry little if any weight as a disciplinary matter, given
that the essential feature of the contingency agreement is that the client
secures legal representation without advance payments in exchange for
surrender of a known percentage of the recovery. 67
Stated simply, if a lawyer charges a standard contingency fee in a tort
claim, then that essentially ends the ethics inquiry. There is no case-by-
case enforcement of even gross abuses of ethical rules regulating contin-
gency fee use. The failure of the disciplinary process is so massive that in
the context of the ethical issues raised in this Article one may say that there
are no ethical rules regulating the use of standard contingency fees. In
addition to the survey results, analysis of both reported and unreported
disciplinary cases confirms this conclusion.68
67. Bar Counsel Statement.
68. Over the course of more than a half century of disciplinary enforcement of ethics
codes and at least one hundred million standard contingency fee tort representations, there have
been, at most, three cases in which lawyers have been disciplined for charging standard
contingency fees in tort cases when ethically mandated commensurate risk was absent. That
number was obtained by counting cases in which the disciplinary penalty was the result of
more seriously regarded infractions. See People v. Robertson, 908 P.2d 96, 97 (Colo. 1995).
In consolidated disciplinary proceedings brought against a lawyer, the court held that the
lawyer violated MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) by charging a
one-third contingency fee in an automobile accident case in which the responsible party's
insurance company did not dispute liability and offered the full limit of the insurance policy
to the plaintiff. Thus, there was "effectively no risk of nonrecovery and little work was
performed on the client's behalf." Id. In two other disciplinary matters, the lawyer's
misconduct involved contingency fee abuses, but also the more seriously regarded violations
of conversion of client funds, abandoning clients, misrepresentation, and forgery. See
Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Gallaher, 376 S.E.2d 346, 350 (W.Va.
1988); infra note 102 (providing discussion of Gallaher); see also In re Swartz, 686 P. 2d
1236, 1243-44 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that one-third contingency fee was "unreasonable and
clearly excessive" because: "There was nothing novel or difficult about the case and it was not
even necessary to file a legal action. At the most, only thirty hours of time were expended
on the case."). For a critique of Swartz, see Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 22, at 86.
There are an additional 20 cases in which courts have disciplined lawyers for charging
standard contingency fees for processing claims for life insurance proceeds, estate proceeds,
personal injury protection (no fault) first party auto insurance proceeds, and courts have
disciplined lawyers in similar nontort situations when there was no risk of nonrecovery and
for combining standard contingency fees with other fees that, in toto, constituted "clearly
excessive fees." See In re Myrland, 95 P.2d 56, 58-60 (Ariz. 1939) (disciplining lawyer who
charged client one-third contingency fee to file and collect payment of creditor's claim against
estate). In Myrland, the court described the lawyer's service as "something an ordinary law
clerk could have done" because the claim was not contested or unrecoverable. Id. The court
also noted that the law firm had requested that a fixed fee be negotiated in advance even if the
claim was not contested. Id. The court held that the "fee charge is not only excessive and
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unconscionable, but a ruthless disregard of the rights of the forwarding attorneys," who were
authorized to charge their creditor/client only up to $100. Id. at 60; see also In re Zang, 741
P.2d 267, 285 (Ariz. 1987), af4'd, 762 P.2d 538, 540 (Ariz. 1988) (stating that one-third
contingency fee was "excessive" because lawyers "did nothing to earn a fee" for collecting
medical payment received in error or for collecting property settlement which had been offered
twice to client by insurance company before lawyers had been retained); In re Kennedy, 472
A.2d 1317, 1322 (Del. 1983) (concluding that 40% contingency fee was "clearly excessive"
when client had "clear entitlement" to temporary total disability payments under Workers'
Compensation statute); Florida Bar v. Gentry, 475 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 1985) (finding that
one-third contingency fee for recovery .of client's personal injury protection (PIP) benefits was
"excessive" because "[tihe noncontingent PIP benefits were paid over without undue hesitation
on the part of the insurance carrier," and lawyer's fee was "based solely on the labor" of
having carrier re-issue check); Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145, 148 (Fla. 1975)
(concluding that one-third contingency fee was "manifestly improper" in case in which major
asset of estate passed to client/beneficiary by operation of law and observing that case "frankly
could have easily been performed by a layman"); Florida Bar v. Winn, 208 So. 2d 809, 810
(Fla. 1968) (affirming disciplinary board's finding that 50% contingency fee for recovery of
property in divorce case was "extortionate" because client was entitled to deceased husband's
share in estate held by entireties by operation of law of survivorship); In re Cohran, 396
S.E.2d 782, 782-83 (Ga. 1990) (finding that 50% contingency fee in case in which estate
proceeds passed to client by operation of law violated prohibition against charging "illegal or
clearly excessive fee," but lawyer was disciplined for his "false and fraudulent" representation
to client "that he was billing her for services rendered by him in recovering assets" because
fee violation was not alleged in complaint); In re Gerard, 548 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Ill. 1989)
(concluding that one-third contingency fee was "excessive" in case in which elderly client
mistakenly believed that her certificates of deposit had been stolen and that lawyer "recovered"
them by telephoning client's banks); In re Teichner, 470 N.E.2d 972, 977-78 (Il. 1984)
(stating that 25% contingency fee for collecting "unquestioned, routine payment" under group
life insurance policy was "not only in excess of a reasonable fee, but was unconscionable");
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Newberg, 839 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1992) (finding that 45%
contingency fee was "clearly excessive" based solely on recovery of basic reparation benefits
paid by insurance company to administratrix of estate); Westchester County Bar Ass'n v. St.
John, 350 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (concluding that one-third contingency
fee was "excessive" for processing insurance claim for accidental death benefits); Cleveland
Bar Ass'n v. Podor, 647 N.E.2d 470, 470 (Ohio 1995) (finding that collecting contingency fee
of 40% on both slip-and-fall settlement and HMO lien on settlement constituted "clearly
excessive fee" under DR 2-106(A) and that such fee, in addition to attorney's conflict of
interest, warranted six-month suspension that could be suspended if attorney completed two-
year monitored probation); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Okocha, 632 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-
86 (Ohio 1994) (finding that charging "nonrefundable retainer" of $12,000 plus 40% contin-
gency fee, after first agreeing to "forgo any contingent fee as well as the retainer fee," "twice
violated DR 2-106(A) (charging clearly excessive fee)," and, in addition to dishonesty and
commingling client funds, warranted indefinite suspension); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Schultz,
643 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ohio 1994) (finding that contingent fee agreement authorizing
collection of fee on any subrogated claims paid from client settlement or judgment and hourly
rate charge if client discharged firm was "contrary to the shared risk of nonrecovery that a
contingent-fee agreement represents;" also finding that collecting nonrefundable fees and not
allowing client access to file until signing undated release warranted holding majority share-
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III. Summary of Survey Results
To elicit the empirical data leading to this conclusion, I surveyed bar
counsel and asked them to respond to a hypothetical "aggrieved client"
letter sent to a disciplinary board. The letter set forth at least a prima facie
case that a contingency fee lawyer, charging a standard contingency fee,
had grossly overcharged the client. As conveyed in the letter, the lawyer
almost certainly knew at the outset that the case was devoid of risk, that
insurance policy limits or close thereto would almost certainly be tendered
with little or no effort on the lawyer's part, and that the effective hourly
rate of return to the lawyer would be at least $1000 per hour and possibly
as much as $2500 per hour.69
The responses to the survey divide into two broad groupings: (1) those
who saw the issue raised by the hypothetical client letter as a fee dispute
and therefore not involving any ethical issue or meriting any further interest
from bar counsel (37.7%) and (2) those who indicated that the client letter
would elicit further proceedings by the office of the disciplinary counsel
(62.3 %) - a group which included those that saw ethical issues raised by
the lawyer's conduct set forth in the hypothetical client letter. Because the
holder of legal professional association vicariously liable for these disciplinary offenses by
association's attorneys); Lake County Bar Ass'n v. Lillback, 535 N.E.2d 300, 301 (Ohio
1989) (noting that 25% contingency fee violated DR 2-106 in case in which lawyer "had
nothing to do with obtaining the estate proceeds" for client and lawyer would have charged
substantially smaller fee for his services had he billed hourly fee); In re Taylor, 5 DB Rptr.
1, 2-4 (Or. 1991) (finding public reprimand as sanction for charging standard contingency fee
when lawyer knew insurance company would pay PIP benefits to client before being retained);
In re Richards, 274 P.2d 797, 797 (Or. 1954) (stating that 50% contingent fee was "so
exorbitant and wholly disproportionate to the services performed as to shock the conscience"
in case in which 84-year-old client of "low grade education" was entitled to receive one-half
the value of his wife's estate as her widower: "[t]here was no warrant in taking the business
on a contingent basis" because "[n]o opposition was imminent and no legal problems of
consequence were evident when . . . [the lawyer] made his contingent fee agreement")
(citations omitted); In re Hanna, 362 S.E.2d 632, 634 (S.C. 1987) (finding that 40% contin-
gency fee for collection of client's PIP benefits was "excessive" because "[nbothing was
required by the [insurance] carrier for prompt payment . . . except that the application be
completed"); In re Stafford, 216 P.2d 746, 747-48 (Wash. 1950) (concluding that 50%
contingency fee was "exorbitant and unconscionable" when client was beneficiary of life
insurance policy and "[n]o legal problems were involved" in collection of proceeds); Com-
mittee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d. 107, 112 (W.Va
1986) (determining that 33% contingent fee was "clearly excessive" for recovering life
insurance payment when there was "never any legitimate doubt about the receipt of the
proceeds").
69. See infra Part V (providing copy of Letter from Aggrieved Client to Disciplinary
Agency used in survey).
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hypothetical client letter raised multiple issues, the responses of the latter
required analysis to isolate those bar counsel who identified the lawyer's
gross overcharges by use of a standard contingency fee as the dominant
ethical issue from those who saw other ethical issues as dominant.
Of those who saw that the lawyer's conduct raised ethical questions,
most identified the dominant issues as violations of statutory fee limits,
failure to communicate, failure to enter into a written contingency fee
agreement, and failure to provide a closing statement. The total number of
bar counsel who clearly identified the gross overcharge as the primary issue
was four out of fifty-three responses! Even had these four bar counsel
pursued the matter by instituting a disciplinary proceeding, based on an
analysis of reported disciplinary cases in the United States70 and extensive
discussion with bar counsel regarding unpublished cases, the probability is
extremely low - bordering on nonexistent - that even in so clear-cut an
instance, the disciplinary agency would have disciplined the lawyer, let
alone ordered her to refund a portion of the fee to the client.7
Thus, the data make clear that case-by-case enforcement is, in reality,
a shibboleth - a stratagem advocated by those who want to give the
appearance of active enforcement, but who in fact favor the status quo. At
the disciplinary board level, there is essentially no enforcement of ethical
mandates purporting to avert or even to deter gross overcharging by contin-
gency fee lawyers.
IV. The Methodology
To determine the efficacy of the case-by-case enforcement method, a
survey form was prepared and sent to all Puerto Rico's and fifty states'
70. See supra note 68 (listing disciplinary cases).
71. Apart from the views of bar counsel, the lack of enforcement may also be
attributed to institutional factors. Thus, one bar counsel observed:
In relation to disciplinary proceedings and ethical violations [involving fee
disputes], the burden is upon Bar Counsel to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence misconduct (i.e., violation of an ethical rule). For these reasons, quite
often a fee dispute does not rise to the level of an ethical violation (or at least an
ethical violation which can be proved).
Bar Counsel Statement. Another bar counsel indicated:
Clients often fear overreaching in contingent fee agreements, and there is
a common belief that contingent fees are "standard." Misconduct is very difficult
to prove by clear and convincing evidence. . . . I don't have to tell you how
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disciplinary counsel listed in the ABA's Directory of Lawyer Disciplinary
Agencies.' The survey consisted of a cover letter explaining the purpose
of the survey, a two-page hypothetical "client letter,"73 a one-page question-
naire,74 and a self-addressed stamped envelope. A second mailing and
telephone calls followed the original survey. In total, sixty-six question-
naires elicited fifty-three responses - an 80.3% response rate.75
Reporting the results of the survey required a decision whether to
attribute responses to specific bar counsel, to bar counsel offices, or not at
all. The survey inferred but did not promise anonymity.76  Some bar
counsel identified their office; a few identified themselves. I was able to
identify the office of most bar counsel either from cases cited, identifica-
tions listed, or postmarks. This turned out to be critical in obtaining the
very high response rate. Those offices that had not responded were sub-
jected to a barrage of follow-up phone calls, faxes, and letters, leaving only
the truly intransigent as nonrespondents. 77
72. Originally, 69 questionnaires were mailed out. The number of questionnaires
exceeds the number of states because in some instances a state has more than one bar
disciplinary agency, e.g., some are divided geographically. Puerto Rico accounts for three
of the questionnaires and Ohio for seven. The total number of outstanding questionnaires
was reduced to 66 when one state's bar counsel answered for his own office and two other
offices in his state, and another state's bar counsel answered for both of its two state offices.
73. See infra Part V (providing reproduction of sample client letter).
74. See infra appendix I (providing copy of questionnaire).
75. I received responses from 53 offices. Fifty-one offices returned questionnaires,
and two offices submitted a letter of explanation without a questionnaire. Of those respond-
ing by questionnaire, some also included a cover letter of explanation or a marked-up "client
letter" or both.
For the two responses that sent a letter of explanation without including a question-
naire, their responses to Question One were deduced from the content of their letters. For
a description of how this was accomplished, see infra note 86. Additionally, one bar
counsel office returned two questionnaires. These two questionnaires, which were virtually
identical, were combined to constitute one questionnaire from that state. All of the answers
from this state's questionnaire were included in the statistics.
Although only the questionnaire responses were included in the statistics, the other
materials submitted were used to aid in determining which issues the disciplinary counsel
viewed as significant.
76. See infra appendix I (providing questionnaire). Question Nine stated: "(Optional)
please identify the name of your office."
77. The cover letters stated that reading the client letter and filling out the question-
naire would only take a moment. One respondent answered the first six questions and in
response to Question Seven, stated: "You said it would only take a moment. I have given
you the moment you requested." Bar Counsel Statement. For Question Eight, the bar
counsel responded: "See Answer to No. 7." Id.
1361
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339 (1996)
In keeping with an unspoken promise, I have opted not to identify bar
counsel by name or office. This accounts for the frequent reference in
footnotes to "Bar Counsel Statement." In some instances, however, bar
counsel cited to cases, and analysis of those cases played a significant role
in classification of ambiguous responses. Without access to those cases,
others could not subject my reasoning to scrutiny. Accordingly, I have
listed the cases. In those instances when the case citations are reproduced,
the bar counsel offices are thus effectively identified.
V. Letter from Aggrieved Client to Disciplinary Agency
The following letter was sent to sixty-nine disciplinary agencies:
Dear Sirs:
Four months ago, I retained Mr. Shane, an attorney, to represent me
in a suit against Globus Trucking. One of their vehicles hit me while
I was stopped at a stop light. I have been laid up for several months
and I am only now getting back to work. Per the request of my lawyer
who advised me that this was the standard arrangement, I signed a
contingency fee agreement whereby I agreed to pay 33 % of the gross
amount of any settlement, 40% if it went to trial and 50% if the trial
went to verdict.
My lawyer told me the case was worth several hundred thousand
dollars. However, the settlement he obtained was for $40,000. When
I complained, he indicated the maximum insurance coverage available
was $50,000 and that litigating for the additional $10,000 could jeopar-
dize the entire recovery. His fee was $13,333.00 and I received
$26,350 out of which I paid almost $7500 in hospital and doctor bills
which were not covered by my insurance; also not covered was $8600
of wages which I lost while laid up.
I have tried to pay close attention to what has been going on - even
calling from my hospital room.. Most of the time, my lawyer was
unable to come to the phone. Now I am trying to find out what work
my lawyer did on this case. He keeps telling me that when he took the
case he had no idea that there would be any recovery, though that is not
what he told me then. When I asked for more details, he replied with
answers like: I had to spend a lot of time convincing the insurance
company to pay up, preparing for trial, investigating the accident, etc.
When I asked for copies of correspondence, he replied that most of the
work had been done by phone. When I asked him how much time he
had spent, he replied that he doesn't keep time records but that the time
required was considerable and that but for his considerable skill, there
was a good chance that the offer would have been much lower.
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Despite this, I believe that my lawyer overcharged me. Based upon
the first few conversations I had with him, I think he was able to settle
this in the first few weeks while doing very little work and he just strung
me along for a few months so I would believe that more was going on.
Can he do this? Is this ethical? Am I entitled to some refund?




VT. Issues in the Hypothetical
I constructed the hypothetical with multiple issues for several reasons.
One reason was that I was concerned that the bar counsel would too quickly
conclude that this was a fee dispute to be relegated to an arbitration or
mediation process and thus end their consideration of the questionnaire
almost instantly. To engage these bar counsel in further examination, I
presented additional issues in the hope that this would lead them to more
considered thought about the fee issue. These additional issues, however,
were collateral to my main purpose, which was to determine whether the
bar counsel regard a lawyer's charging a standard contingency fee likely
amounting to $1000 to $2500 per hour in a matter in which there was
(1) no issue of liability, (2) very little work to be done - perhaps a few
telephone calls or letters, (3) a virtual certainty of a substantial insurance
payment, and (4) the foreknowledge of the above by the attorney at the time
of contracting as raising a potential violation of DR 2-106(A) or Model
Rule 1.5(a)'s proscription of charging excessive or unreasonable fees.7" If
most bar counsel do not perceive such facts to constitute a violation, then
it is reasonable to conclude that there is no case-by-case enforcement of the
ethical rules.
The collateral issues raised by the hypothetical included: (1) the lack of
communication;79 (2) questions of competence, i.e., whether the attorney
properly investigated whether other assets were available in addition to
the insurance proceeds;' (3) the lack of a signed retainer agreement;81 and
78. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1986); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1995).
79. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1995).
80. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 6-101 (1986); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1, 1.3 (1995).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (1995).
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(4) the lack of a closing statement.' The core ethical issue posed by the
hypothetical, however, involved the charging of a standard contingency fee
in the circumstances enumerated. One may analyze this issue as a matter
of the fiduciary obligation of the lawyer to deal fairly with the client in fee-
setting negotiations by presenting sufficient information to the client to
enable the client to consent to both the fee structure and the fee.'
It is the duty of the attorney to deal fairly with prospective clients and
to avoid unilateral determination of the fee arrangement. This fiduciary
obligation is mirrored in the ethics codes. In interpreting the Model Code,
ABA Informal Opinion 86-1521 advised that "[a] lawyer normally has an
obligation to offer a prospective client an alternative fee arrangement before
accepting a matter on a contingent fee basis."I It appears quite likely that
82. Id.; see infra note 101 (compiling statistical information of collateral issues raised
in hypothetical). Other less significant issues may be gleaned from the hypothetical. For
example, one issue may be the attorney's puffing the value of the case in order to entice the
client into retaining the attorney. The medical bills of the client amounted to $7500 and lost
wages were $8600, and yet the attorney advised the client that the case was worth "several
hundred thousand dollars." After the settlement offer, the attorney then stated that when he
took the case he did not know if there would even be a recovery. This at least suggests
that the attorney attempted to induce the client to enter into a retainer agreement by
substantially overstating the likely outcome. This is a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and
Model Rule 8.4(c).
83. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 22, at 49-70.
84. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1521 (1986),
reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 901:310. The
ABA addressed the question of "whether a lawyer has an ethical obligation to offer a client
an alternative fee arrangement before accepting a matter on a contingent fee basis." Id.
The ABA stated:
Although neither Rule 1.5 nor DR 2-106 states specifically whether a lawyer
must offer an alternative fee arrangement, that issue must be addressed in a
context of the "reasonableness" and "clearly excessive" tests of the Model Rules
and the Model Code, the commonly expressed rationale for permitting contingent
fees and the Comment to Rule 1.5 and the Ethical Considerations of the Model
Code. The Comment to Rule 1.5 states: "When there is doubt whether a contin-
gent fee is consistent with the client's best interest, the lawyer should offer the
client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications." EC 2-20 of
the Model Code notes the rationale for permitting contingent fees and then states:
"Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contin-
gent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessar-
ily improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a
case, to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client who,
after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement." As
noted in the EC, contingent fees are not necessarily improper even when the
client has the money to pay a fixed fee; however, if the client is in a position to
pay a fixed fee, the lawyer should permit the client to make the decision whether
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the client was not offered a choice of a fee arrangement in place of the
standard contingency fee agreement foisted on him by the attorney. In
addition to the requirement that the lawyer offer the client a choice between
a fixed or hourly rate fee instead of a contingency fee, "regardless of
whether the lawyer, the prospective client, or both, are initially inclined
towards a contingent fee," the lawyer had an obligation, as stated in Formal
Opinion 94-389, to discuss with the. client "the nature (and details) of the
compensation arrangement" before entering into the fee agreement. 8s
In applying the factors that the ABA Standing Committee opined a
lawyer was ethically obligated to discuss with the client before entering into
a fee agreement to the facts of the hypothetical case, it appears: (1) that
success is likely (factor a); (2) that collection from the insurance company
would not be difficult (factor e); (3) that the lawyer's investment in time
would be minimal (factor g); and (4) that an hourly fee would be economi-
cally advantageous to the client (factor h). Therefore, the attorney should
have disclosed to the client before proffering a standard contingency fee
agreement: (1) that an hourly rate fee would have been in the client's
interest; (2) that if the client nonetheless chose to enter into a contingency
fee agreement, the degree of risk and the likely recovery would not justify
charging a standard contingency fee; and (3) that virtually all risk of
nonrecovery would be eliminated by waiting to enter into a contingency fee
agreement with the attorney until after he had contacted the responsible
party's insurance company.
Irrespective of the ABA factors, and of critical importance, it appears
highly likely that the attorney charged a grossly excessive and unreasonable
fee in violation of DR 2-106(A), DR 2-106(B)(8), and Model Rule 1.5(a).
to pay a reasonable fixed fee or to pay a percentage fee contingent on results.
Similarly, under the Comment to Rule 1.5, when a client is in a position to pay
a fixed fee, the lawyer should not seek unilaterally to determine whether a
contingent fee is consistent with the client's best interest, but should provide the
client with the opportunity to make that determination after consultation.
Id. at 901:311 (citation omitted). The opinion went on to state:
[,ihen there is any doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's
best interest, which can normally be determined only in light of all the facts and
circumstances after consultation with the client, the lawyer must offer the client
the opportunity to engage counsel on a reasonable fixed fee basis before entering
into a contingent fee arrangement.
Id. at 901:312.
85. Formal Opinion 94-389, supra note 16, at 1001:251 (emphasis added). The
ABA's opinion lists 13 factors that the attorney should "considerl and discusso]" with the
client before determining the compensation arrangement. See supra note 51 for a list of
these factors.
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The attorney collected a fee of $13,333.00 for his representation, which
occurred over a period of four months. However, from the facts presented
by the client, it is highly probable that the lawyer negotiated the settlement
after the expenditure of five to ten hours of the attorney's time, leading to
the possibility that the effective rate of return was $1300 to $2600 per hour.
The l&ter written by the aggrieved client raised, if it did not demonstrate,
the strong possibility that the lawyer knew at the time of his retention that
given the severity of the injuries and the nearly complete absence of any
issue of liability, Globus's insurance company would tender an amount close
to the policy limit with little or no effort on the lawyer's part. By charging
a standard (and therefore substantial) contingency fee under such circum-
stances, the facts in the letter present a strong basis for concluding that a
violation of ethical mandates occurred. Indeed, it would appear that the
attorney was well aware at the time of contracting that he would be obtaining
a fee of $1000 to $2500 per hour (assuming five to ten hours of effort to
obtain the settlement offer and the fee of $13,333.00) - all this in the
absence of any meaningful risk of a low or no fee recovery. At a minimum,
the client letter raised the issues of whether the attorney informed the client
at the time of entering into the fee arrangement that the insurance company
would likely tender the policy limits with little work to be done by the
attorney, and whether the attorney's failure to do so deprived the client of
the information essential to giving informed consent to the proffered standard
contingency fee agreement. Furthermore, the letter raised the issue whether
that failure alone constituted charging an excessive or unreasonable fee.
Disciplinary counsel overwhelmingly did not perceive that the letter raised
any ethical issue by charging a standard contingency fee in a case substan-
tially devoid of any contingency.
VIL The Results of the Survey
A. Disciplinary Counsel Who Viewed the Hypothetical As a
Matter for Fee Arbitration
More than one-third (twenty of fifty-three, or 37.7%) of the responses did
not view the hypothetical as raising an ethics issue, but rather a fee dispute
to be resolved through fee arbitration.86 These disciplinary counsel indicated
86. For the bar counsel who sent letters of explanation in place of a questionnaire, I
constructed an answer to Question One in keeping with the contents of the letters. One bar
counsel letter made clear that they regarded the issue as a fee dispute to be resolved by a
separate committee, the Committee for the Resolution of Fee Disputes. For comparative
purposes, I listed their answer to Question One as 75%. The letter from another bar counsel
identified the hypothetical as a fee dispute to be referred to the bar's Attorney-Client
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that there was a high probability that referral to fee arbitration would occur
on the hypothetical facts. For example, one stated that "virtually all [such
complaints] are dismissed with or without a hearing." 87 This is supported by
another bar counsel who stated: "If the documentation established that the
attorney had taken the matter on the contingency as described, we would
dismiss the disciplinary grievance while referring the client to the Bar's
Attorney-Client Arbitration Board." 88
B. Disciplinary Counsel Wo Did Not View the Hypothetical
As a Matter for Fee Arbitration
A majority of bar counsel (thirty-three of fifty-three, or 62.3%) did not
view the hypothetical as simply, or primarily, a matter for fee arbitration. 89
Consistent with this position, 84.8% of this majority group indicated in
response to Question Two that it was highly likely that the client letter would
result in further proceedings by their office. 90 Not surprisingly, 90.9% of
this group responded to Question Four that the likelihood was great that the
attorney would be requested to supply more information.91 This indicates
Arbitration Board and not to be considered as an ethical violation. Accordingly, I listed
their answer to Question One as 100%. Both of these answers were included in the statistics
relating to Question One.
As explained supra in note 75, one bar counsel returned two questionnaires. As both
questionnaires tracked each other's answers almost identically, one combined questionnaire
was constructed and included in the statistics.
Accordingly, 20 disciplinary counsel responded that there was a 75% or greater
likelihood the matter would be referred to fee arbitration and that no further action would
be taken (Question One). See infra appendix ll (presenting fee arbitration responses and
analyzing 20 responses indicating likelihood of arbitration).
87. Bar Counsel Statement. In a similar vein, other bar counsel stated: "[T]his type
of common complaint would ordinarily be referred to a fee arbitration program." Bar
Counsel Statement. "It is very unlikely this type of grievance would be opened for investi-
gation." Bar Counsel Statement..
88. Bar Counsel Statement.
89. Of the bar counsel responding to Question One, 30 responded that there was a
25% or less likelihood that the matter would be referred to fee arbitration. Although three
disciplinary counsel did not respond to this question, their remaining answers indicated that
they did not view the hypothetical as a matter for fee arbitration. Therefore, they would
also fall into this category, bringing the total of those judging the likelihood of referral to
fee arbitration at 25% or less to 33.
90. Twenty-eight of the 33 bar counsel in the majority group stated that there was a
better than 75% likelihood that further proceedings would be instituted (Question Two).
91. Thirty of the 33 bar counsel in the majority group responded that there was a 75%
or better likelihood that the attorney would be requested to supply more information
(Question Four).
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that these bar counsel believed that the lawyer's conduct raised ethical
issues. Thus, a discontinuity appears in the data. Given the responses
discussed so far, especially the responses to Question Two - concerning
the need for further proceedings - it is reasonable to anticipate that the
answers to subsequent questions would indicate that disciplinary proceed-
ings would likely result in a significant number of instances and that cita-
tions to examples of similar disciplinary events would be provided. The
survey results, however, contradict any such expectation. Question Three
asks about the likelihood that a disciplinary event would result. Only seven
of these thirty-three (21.2%) thought there was a 50% likelihood that a
disciplinary event would result based on the client's letter and only two of
the thirty-three (6.1%) thought there was a 100% likelihood that a disciplin-
ary event would result. 2 The significance of these responses is accentuated
by the fact that although 78.8% of the majority group responded that they
recalled having situations arise in their office similar to the hypothetical
(Question Five),9' they further indicated that only 50% of those situations
resulted in a disciplinary event (Question Six). It appears then that bar
counsel are indicating that whatever further actions they initially undertook,
including seeking further information and instituting further proceedings,'
these actions would rarely result in a disciplinary event. As one bar
counsel concisely described it: "This matter would likely be evaluated and
investigated, but then probably dismissed with referral to a fee dispute
mediator. "95
To determine which bar counsel perceived the core ethics issue, I ex-
cluded from further consideration those bar counsel who answered "no" to
Question Five, assuming that every disciplinary office has received at least
some client complaints of gross overcharging by contingency fee lawyers. 96
Therefore, a response stating that the bar counsel did not "recall ever
having situations arise in your office similar to the hypothetical in which
92. Fifteen of the 33 (45.5%) answered that a disciplinary outcome was unlikely.
Nine out of 33 (27.3 %) did not answer the question.
93. Twenty-six of the 33 bar counsel in the majority group recalled having a similar
situation occur in their office and which resulted in a follow-up (Question Five).
94. This initially aggressive stance of the bar counsel is borne out by their comments:
"We would definitely look into the matter as a disciplinary case .... ." Bar Counsel
Statement. "Since this case raises a spectra of fraud, it would be thoroughly investigated
by Bar counsel and unless this attorney had a really good response (which I can't imagine)
he would be in big trouble ...... Bar Counsel Statement.
95. Bar Counsel Statement.
96. As one bar counsel observed: "[C]lients often complain that the fees were exces-
sive." Bar Counsel Statement.
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your office had followed up" is the equivalent of stating such gross over-
charges were not regarded as a disciplinable response.'
From those twenty-six who answered "yes" to Question Five, I then
excluded from further consideration those who answered "no" to Ques-
tion Six, regarding disciplinary events in response to any similar com-
plaints.98 The basis for this decision is that the most reasonable explanation
of why a disciplinary agency would fail to discipline a lawyer who engaged
in conduct similar to that set forth in the hypothetical, when such conduct
had been brought to the attention of the agency, is that the agency did not
regard the gross overcharging by the contingency fee lawyer as a violation
of the ethical requirements." 9
97. One bar counsel who responded "no" to Question Five, listed an on-point exces-
sive contingency fee case, In re Taylor, 5 DB Rptr. 1 (Or. 1991), in which a lawyer
retained to collect PIP insurance benefits knew before being retained that an insurance
company was going to pay the claim, but charged standard contingency fees, which yielded
him an hourly rate of $280 to $350. In re Taylor, 5 DB Rptr. 1, 2-4 (Or. 1991). The court
found that the lawyer violated DR 2-106(A) by clear and convincing evidence necessitating
a public reprimand. Id. Despite the definitiveness of a "no" answer to Question Five, I
placed that bar counsel in the final group of four that perceived the core ethics issue because
the case citation supplied was directly on point.
98. Of the 26 bar counsel who did not characterize the matter as one for fee arbitration
and who had followed up on similar situations to the hypothetical that occurred in their
office, 13 of the 26 answered that those follow-ups resulted in a disciplinary event (Question
Six).
Two other bar counsel who recognized possible grounds for a disciplinary proceeding
supplied citations. However, they were not included in the group of 13 bar counsel who
indicated that situations similar to the hypothetical had occurred in their office and which
had resulted in a disciplinary event. One bar counsel responded that although their office
followed up on a situation similar to the hypothetical, no disciplinary event resulted, and the
other bar counsel responded that no situations had arisen in their office similar to the
hypothetical which led to a follow-up.
In confirmation of this decision, the former bar counsel cited a case not on point and
responded that no disciplinary events had occurred in their office on facts similar to our
hypothetical. See In re Jones, 889 P.2d 837, 838 (N.M. 1995) (giving two-year suspension
for commingling client and office funds, using funds for attorney's personal use, and
charging excessive fee because attorney performed no work). The latter bar counsel cited
two cases, one of which was generally on point. In re Taylor, 5 DB Rptr 1, 2-4 (Or. 1991);
see supra note 97 (discussing Taylor case). As noted, although this bar counsel responded
that they did not have situations in their office similar to the hypothetical which were
followed up, based upon the case citation, I advanced that bar counsel response into the final
group of those who recognized the core ethics issue.
99. On one occasion, a bar counsel answering "yes" to Question Five and "no" to
Question Six illustrated nonrecognition of the ethical violation by stating that the issues he
or she perceived were a failure to communicate and the possible charging of a contingent
fee in excess of a statutory limit.
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As indicated, one-half of all responding bar counsel who did not charac-
terize the matter as one for fee arbitration, stated in response to Question
Five, that a similar situation arose in their office.1"0 One-half of that group,
or thirteen, answered in response to Question Six that these similar situa-
tions had resulted in a disciplinary event. Thus, the critical question
becomes: On which ethical issues was that group of thirteen bar counsel
focusing? Were they focusing on the violation of statutory requirements,
a lack of communication, the absence of a signed retainer agreement, a lack
of competence, or the excessive fee and core contingency fee issues? 01
The answer may be found in the responses to Questions Seven and
Eight. Question Seven asked that citations be given for the disciplinary
outcomes generated by situations similar to the hypothetical. Question
Eight asked for the number of such disciplinary events over the past ten
years if they had not been reported.
Of the thirteen jurisdictions indicating that there had been previous
disciplinary proceedings in circumstances similar to those contained in the
hypothetical, only two listed citations to such proceedings. One dealt with
the excessive fee issue in the broad context of a contingency fee agreement
similar to the one set out in the hypothetical." - The other citation dealt
100. See supra note 93 (stating number of bar counsel who recalled having similar
situation which resulted in follow-up).
101. The disciplinary counsel who commented on the hypothetical, either directly on
their questionnaires, by returning a marked-up client letter, or by enclosing an explanatory
cover letter, noted many issues to be considered. Some responses indicated multiple issues
while others indicated only one. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
In order of frequency, seven responses cited the attorney's failure to communicate;
five noted the attorney's failure to account for or turn over the file to the client; four cited
the excessiveness of the fee charged; two noted the apparent incompetence of the attorney,
questioned the amount of the fee in general terms, noted the possibility that a settlement
might have been reached without client approval, or noted that statutory fee limits were
exceeded; and one indicated the attorney's lack of diligence, the lack of a written agreement,
or the puffing of the claim's potential value.
102. See Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Gallaher, 376 S.E.2d
346, 351 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that 50% fee was excessive, but 33% fee was proper).
In Gallaher, the claimant suffered an injury while a passenger in a car driven by her son
and incurred medical bills in excess of $2300. Id. at 347. Her son's insurance company
offered $726.25 in settlement, which she rejected. Id. The claimant, who could neither
read nor write and had no prior experience with lawyers, then retained counsel. Id. She
told her lawyer that she would not sue her son. Id. The claimant did not execute a fee
contract and did not discuss fees with the lawyer. Id. The lawyer reviewed medical records
and bills and made a demand on the insurance company. Id. Three weeks later, the
insurance company offered $4500. Id. The claimant's counsel accepted, only later obtain-
ing the client's assent. Id. at 348. At that time, the lawyer said his fee would be 50% of
the recovery. Id. The claimant stated that the lawyer said the insurance company would
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with misrepresenting matters to a client, 3 indicating that the bar counsel
either did not recognize or rejected the core excessive fee issue. Eliminat-
ing the latter response, the pool of bar counsel who had similar situations
in their office that resulted in disciplinary proceedings, and who likely had
in mind the excessive and unreasonable fee issue shrinks to twelve.
Of the twelve remaining responses, five questionnaires provided no
explicit clues as to the driving force behind the bar counsel's answers.
However, the fact that none of these five bar counsel cited to any published
disciplinary proceedings similar to the hypothetical and failed to indicate
that there were any nonpublished proceedings such as private reprimands,
strongly indicates that they did not regard the excessive fee issue as the, or
even a, dominant one in the litany of issues raised by the hypothetical.
How else to explain that these bar counsel, who indicated that there had
been previous disciplinary proceedings in their office in circumstances
similar to those described in the hypothetical, failed to identify disciplinary
proceedings involving contingency fee lawyers charging standard contin-
gency fees in cases with a very high probability of a substantial insurance
payment with little or no effort by the lawyer and thus an absence of risk?
Accordingly, these five responses were eliminated.
From the remaining seven bar counsel who indicated that there were
previous disciplinary proceedings in circumstances similar to the hypotheti-
cal, but who did not provide citations, comments on their questionnaires
showed that four of the bar counsel did not regard the core fee issue as
dominant. One bar counsel commented that "[tihe matter would likely be
evaluated and investigated, but then probably dismissed with referral to a
pay all future medical bills - which it did not. Id. The attorney claimed to have worked
16.6 hours for an hourly fee of $140. Id. The court concluded that the 50% fee was
excessive and that it violated DR 2-106. Id. at 350. The court recited several facts to
support its conclusion: there was never any anticipation that suit would be filed (due to the
family relationship); it was clear that the claimant was prepared to accept a modest settle-
ment; the lawyer's investment of time and skill was de minimis; and even though risk was
involved, the fee was grossly disproportionate. Id. The court found a one-third fee
reasonable, ordered the lawyer to refund the difference, and issued a public reprimand to
the lawyer. Id. at 350-51.
103. See In re Foley, 604 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (censuring
attorney even after considering 36-year unblemished record when attorney misrepresented
settlement offer to client, prepared fake closing statement, paid client from attorney's own
account, falsely stated to workers' compensation carrier that claim had been settled, and paid
carrier out of attorney's own funds). In addition to citing Foley, the bar counsel who
answered that there was a 100% likelihood that more information would be sought, stated
that "[a]ll complaints concerning an attorney's failure to properly account to a client for
settlement funds are thoroughly investigated." Bar Counsel Statement.
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fee dispute mediator,''"04 thus removing this bar counsel from the pool.
Two questionnaires had comments indicating that discipline had previously
been imposed for failure to communicate adequately with clients."0 An-
other bar counsel commented: "Have no fee arbitration procedure. Upon
further inquiry many 'fee' type complaints reveal possible violations of
Model Rules 1.3, 1.4(a) or (b), 8.4(c). '  Because these Model Rules
sections respectively deal with matters of diligence, keeping the client
informed,, explaining matters to clients so that the client may make in-
formed decisions, and prohibiting fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresen-
tation, it appears that neither this bar counsel, nor the bar counsel who
indicated that the matter would likely be dismissed and referred to a media-
tor, nor the two bar counsel focusing on the attorney's failure to communi-
cate considered the excessiveness of the contingency fee charged to be an
issue. However, one bar counsel of the seven answered Question Seven
"unearned fee - 6 mo-2 year suspensions"" and another answered Ques-
tion Seven "private censure with return of portion of fee."'108 Based on
these comments, it is reasonable to conclude that these two bar counsel
focused on the core excessive fee issue.' 09
Therefore, we are left with a total of four bar counsel who recognized
the excessive contingency fee issue: the two bar counsel who had com-
mented that they were concerned primarily with the excessive fee issue;" 0
the bar counsel who cited a disciplinary case on excessive fees in contin-
gency fee cases;"' and the bar counsel who cited an on-point excessive
contingency fee case even though he answered "no" to Question Five"
2
104. Bar Counsel Statement.
105. Bar Counsel Statements.
106. Bar Counsel Statement.
107. Bar Counsel Statement.
108. Bar Counsel Statement.
109. Curiously, a search of case law in the jurisdiction of one of these two bar counsel
revealed no instance of discipline for charging an excessive fee in a standard contingency
fee context. See infra notes 132-34. Given the disciplinary jurisprudence of that state, it
is doubtful that a successful prosecution could be mounted. The same is true for the state
jurisprudence of the other bar courisel respondent. Nonetheless, I credited both responses
as recognizing the core issue.
110. See supra notes 107-08.
111. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing case that bar counsel cited
involving excessive fee dispute). Even though I included this bar counsel's response in the
final four, his answer to Question Three, based on the facts of the hypothetical and the work
that his office would likely do, was that there was a small likelihood (10% to 25%) that the
lawyer would be disciplined.
112. See supra note 97.
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regarding whether a similar situation had arisen in his office. These four
positive responses represent 7.5% of the total of fifty-three responses.
13
The conclusion is clear: There is no case-by-case enforcement of the ethics
codes' requirements that contingency fees be reasonable and not clearly
excessive.
Conclusion
The claim of case-by-case enforcement of the ethics codes' admonition
against unreasonable and clearly excessive fees in the contingency fee
context is a pretextual practice utilized to maintain the status quo. It does
not exist - even for the most flagrant violations. If there is to.be any
enforcement of ethical admonitions with regard to contingency fees, it will
have to come from outside of the disciplinary process. But from where?
The rejection by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, in Formal Opinion 94-389, of the request to permit contin-
gency fee clients even the barest modicum of consumer protection would
indicate that the self-regulatory process itself has failed in this area.
The success of the assault on ethical standards is instructive. If contin-
gency fee clients are to receive any protection, it will not be from the ABA,
the judiciary, or the disciplinary process. Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custo-
des."14
113. One of the four positive responses came from a bar counsel in a state that has
never disciplined a lawyer for charging a standard contingency fee in personal injury
representation when liability was not an issue and when the lawyer knew at the outset that
a substantial settlement would likely be obtained with little effort. See supra note 109.
Moreover, giving the benefit of the doubt to the five questionnaires that did not indicate that
the primary focus of the disciplinary proceedings was based on the excessive fee issue, see
supra text following note 103, still produces only a total of nine bar counsels - or just 17%
of those polled - that recognized that an excessive contingency fee raised ethical issues
necessitating investigation and possibly resulting in discipline.
114. JUvENAL, VISATIRES, at line 347, quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTA-
TIONS 122 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980) ("But who is to guard the guards
themselves?"). Plato effectively countered this question 300 years earlier: "What an absurd
idea - a guardian to need a guardian!" PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book 3, 403-E, quoted in
BARTLETT, supra, at 122 n.8. However, Plato never met the ABA.
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Appendix I
The Questionnaire
1. What is the likelihood that your office would refer the sender to a fee
arbitration service and that your office would take no further action?
0% 10-25% 50% 75% 100%
2. How likely is it that this letter would result in further proceedings by
your office other than simple acknowledgment of receipt or reference to
a fee arbitration system?
0% 10-25% 50% 75% 100%
3. What is the likelihood that as a consequence of this letter, a disciplinary
event (defined as private censure or a more serious sanction) would
result?
0% 10-25% 50% 75% 100%
4. What is the likelihood that if your office received this letter you would
request the attorney to supply more information?
0% 10-25% 50% 75% 100%
5. Do you recall ever having a situation arise in your office similar to the
hypothetical in which your office had followed up?
-Yes No
6. If your answer to the preceding question was "Yes" did the follow-up by
your office ever result in a disciplinary event?
Yes No
7. If there have been disciplinary outcomes of which you are aware gener-
ated by situations similar to the hypothetical described in the "client
letter," please give appropriate citations.
8. If any of the disciplinary events remain confidential (such as private
reprimands) how many such disciplinary outcomes have occurred in the
last 10 years in your office?
-(number)
9. (Optional) Please identify the name of your office.
CASE-BY-CASE ENFORCEMENT OF CONTINGENCY FEES
Appendix II




50% 75% 100% No
Answer
Question 1 45.3% 11.3% 0% 22.6% 15.1% 5.7%
(# of responses) (24) (6) (0) (12)115 (8)116 (3)
Question 2 12% 24% 0% 18% 44% 2%
(# of responses) (6) (12) (0) (9) (22) (1)
Question 3 16% 46% 14% 0% 4% 20%
(# of responses) (8) (23) (7) (0) (2) (10)
Question 4 12% 14% 4% 10% 60% 0%
(# of responses) (6) (7) (2) (5) (30) (0)
Yes No No
Answer
Question 5 80% 18% 2%
(# of responses) (40) (9) (1)
Question 6117 50% 37.5% 12.5%
(# of responses) (20) (15) (5)
115. This total includes the constructed response for one jurisdiction based on a letter
response and not a completed questionnaire. See supra note 86.
116. This total includes the response constructed from one jurisdiction's letter of
explanation and the combination of the two questionnaires submitted by one of the jurisdic-
tions. See supra note 86.
117. Only those disciplinary counsel who responded "yes" to Question Five were
included in the results of Question Six.
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Appendix III
Fee Arbitration Responses
More than one-third (37.7%) of the responses viewed the hypothetical
as raising a fee dispute to be resolved through fee arbitration rather than an
ethics issue."l8 Of the group who categorized the complaint as one for fee
arbitration, 83.3 % responded that it was unlikely that further proceedings
would be instituted other than reference to fee arbitration. 9 Not surpris-
ingly, 61.1% of those bar counsel inclined towards fee arbitration were
unlikely to request more information from the attorney."2° A disciplinary
event was not likely to occur according to 94.4% of those bar counsel
inclined towards fee arbitration.12
118. Twenty disciplinary counsel responded that there was a 75% or greater likelihood
the matter would be referred to fee arbitration and that no further action would be taken
(Question One). See"supra note 86 (explaining derivation of three responses).
Although most of these bar counsel wore fee arbitration blinders, some commented
that disciplinary infractions might be present although they also concluded that a disciplinary
result was unlikely to occur, see infra note 121. Some bar counsel comments included: "In
this case, a [fee arbitration] panel may well recommend an investigation since the contingent
percentages appear high (40% to 50%) and the attorney may have misrepresented develop-
ments in the case to the client . . . . [Panels here are not impressed by a lack of time
records and tend to hold that against an attorney in determining the reasonableness of the
fee." Bar Counsel Statement. "The grievance would originally be referred to our fee
grievance committee, and would only be further investigated if evidence that fee was clearly
excessive or illegal, or if evidence of other misconduct." Bar Counsel Statement. "We
would review to see if fees charged were extortionate or fraudulent." Bar Counsel State-
ment.
Another bar counsel noted: "Some complaints [similar to the hypothetical] have been
referred to a hearing committee. Virtually all are dismissed with or without a hearing."
Bar Counsel Statement.
Conversely, two bar counsel saw no issues worthy of discipline presented by the
hypothetical. Their responses tracked each other and stated that the matter would be
referred to fee arbitration, no further action would be undertaken by their office, there was
no chance a disciplinary event would occur, no information would be requested from the
attorney, and no similar situations had ever occurred in their office.
119. Fifteen of the 18 bar counsel choosing the fee arbitration route responded that
there was a 25 % or less likelihood that further proceedings would be instituted (Question
Two).
120. Eleven of the 18 bar counsel inclined towards fee arbitration responded that there
was a 25% or less likelihood that more information would be requested from the attorney
(Question Four).
121. Seventeen of those 18 bar counsel inclined to refer the matter to fee arbitration
replied that there was a 25% or less likelihood that a disciplinary event (defined as private
censure or a more serious sanction) would result (Question Three).
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Despite this categorical fee arbitration classification, 83.3% of bar
counsel favoring arbitration responded that they recalled following up on
a similar situation to the hypothetical."z Furthermore, 46.7% of these bar
counsel responded that their follow-up resulted in a disciplinary event."
How are these responses to be reconciled? Once again the critical question
becomes: Even if the bar counsel perceived the matter as raising ethical
issues, on which ethical issues were they focusing?
Of the seven responses indicating that follow-up of a situation similar to
the hypothetical resulted in a disciplinary event, two indicated by their
comments that they did not recognize, or rejected as an issue, the excessive
contingency fee: "the fee dispute would be referred,""124 and the "fee arbitra-
tion petitions are often accompanied by grievance complaints stating the
same facts . . . . There are cases where the charges have included not
paying a fee arbitration award.""z
Of the remaining five responses indicating follow-up resulted in a discip-
linary event, two provided case citations. One was a disciplinary proceed-
ing in which an attorney collected cumulative fees - thus missing the
hypothetical's core issue of excessive contingency fees."2 The other bar
counsel, although citing a disciplinary proceeding holding a standard contin-
gency fee to be excessive in the facts at issue, 27 nevertheless responded that
122. Fifteen of the 18 bar counsel recalled following up on a situation similar to the
hypothetical in their office (Question Five).
123. Seven of the 15 bar counsel favoring fee arbitration who recalled having a situation
similar to the hypothetical in their office responded that the follow-up by their office resulted
in a disciplinary event (Question Six). It should be noted, however, that one of these seven
responded that there was no chance that a disciplinary event would result from the hypotheti-
cal (Question Three), and that this bar counsel and another responded that there was a 100%
likelihood that they would refer the matter to arbitration and take no firther action.
Although these responses conflict with their answers that follow-ups had resulted in disci-
plinary events in situations similar to the hypothetical in their offices, they are not problem-
atic for our purposes because both bar counsel are ultimately eliminated for failing to
recognize the core contingent fee issue.
124. Bar Counsel Statement.
125. Bar Counsel Statement. This bar counsel also commented on Question Four by
stating that there was a 100% likelihood of requiring the attorney to produce more informa-
tion, "but as part of fee arbitration initially."
126. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harlan, 578 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Md. 1990)
(finding that attorney taking fee on damages recovered in tort action that were paid out to
creditor in addition to fee already charged client was clearly excessive and mandated six-
month suspension).
127. See In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1248 (Ariz. 1984) (holding one-third contin-
gency fee "unreasonable and clearly excessive" because: "There was nothing novel or
difficult about the case and it was not even necessary to file a legal action. At the most,
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a disciplinary event occurring on our hypothetical facts was unlikely. More
importantly, his comments demonstrated his failure to recognize, or his re-
jection of, the excessive fee issue in the hypothetical: "If the failure to com-
municate were of longer duration (i.e., > 4 mos.), that aspect might
trigger further investigation. There is also some indication that the lawyer
accepted the settlement without client approval: we might follow up on that
issue. " "I
Of the remaining three bar counsel who indicated that follow-up resulted
in a disciplinary event, two stated that discipline imposed on facts similar
to the hypothetical would be private. 29 These two bar counsel, however,
stated that there was a 75 % likelihood that they would refer the sender to
fee arbitration and take no further action, and that there was only a 10% to
25% likelihood that a follow-up disciplinary event would result. Although
these bar counsel may have recognized the excessive fee issue as an ethical
matter, it is more likely that they were referring to the failure of an attor-
ney to submit to arbitration or to comply with the outcome of an arbitration
and the ensuing disciplinary proceedings.
The remaining bar counsel commented that a client complaint of the sort
in the hypothetical would "originally be referred to our fee grievance
committee, and would only be further investigated if evidence" was discov-
ered indicating that the "fee was clearly excessive or illegal. '"130 Because
of these comments, I searched that state's case law to determine the in-
stances in which contingency fees were found to violate DR 2-106(A) and
unearthed a total of seven disciplinary cases in which contingency fees and
DR 2-106 played a role. Of these seven disciplinary proceedings, none
dealt squarely with the ethical issue of charging a contingency fee in the
absence of assuming any meaningful.fee risk. The case closest to the core
ethics issue was not even a disciplinary case.' Of the disciplinary cases,
only thirty hours of time were expended on the case.").
128. Bar Counsel Statement.
129. Bar Counsel Statements.
130. Bar Counsel Statement.
131. See In re Settlements of Betts, 587 N.E.2d 997, 1005 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1991)
(finding excessive contingency fee). In Betts, upon an attorney's application for court
approval of a settlement and for attorney's fees in a personal injury case involving two
minors severely injured by a drunk driver, the probate court held that because "there never
was any risk in this case of a non-recovery" against the "substantial insurance policy,"
the requested 33% contingency fee was too great in light of the eight factors contained
in DR 2-106. Id. at 1004. Despite the total absence of any contingency, the court
awarded 20% of the minor's recovery as "the reasonable value of such legal services." Id.
at 1005.
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only one broached the subject obliquely,"' while the others involved
attorneys that altered the terms of the retainer agreement13 or double-
charged clients.3 4 Accordingly, it is difficult to perceive the basis on
which a bar counsel in Ohio - which has no private reprimand system -
responded affirmatively to Question Six unless that counsel was referring
to different ethical questions than those at the core of the hypothetical.135
Therefore, none of the bar counsel who responded that a disciplinary event
resulted from pursuing situations in their offices similar to the hypothetical
appear to have recognized the core issue of excessive contingency fees.
132. See Lake County Bar Ass'n v. Lillback, 535 N.E.2d 300, 300-02 (Ohio 1989)
(lying to probate court regarding source of guardianship funds and charging client one-third
contingency fee in simple probate case, even though lawyer had nothing to do with obtaining
the estate proceeds, warranted two-year suspension from the practice of law for violating
DR 2-106 (excessive fees) and DR 1-102 (dishonest conduct)).
133. See Akron Bar Ass'n v. Naumoff, 578 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Ohio 1991) (finding that
collecting $14,744.30 contingency fee from client who had already signed an hourly
retainer, under which the fee amounted to $2400, and who had not agreed to switch to
contingency fee warranted public reprimand and restitution).
134. See Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Podor, 647 N.E.2d 470, 470-71 (Ohio 1995) (finding
that collecting contingency fee of 40% on both slip-and-fall settlement and HMO lien on
settlement constituted "clearly excessive fee" under DR 2-106(A) and that such fee, in
addition to attorney's conflict of interest, warranted six-month suspension that could be
suspended if attorney completed two-year monitored probation); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v.
Schultz, 643 N.E.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Ohio 1994) (finding that contingent fee agreement
authorizing collection of fee on any subrogated claims paid from client settlement or
judgment and hourly rate charge if client discharged firm was "contrary to the shared risk
of nonrecovery that a contingent-fee agreement represents"; also finding that collecting
nonrefundable fees and not allowing client access to file until signing undated release
warranted holding majority shareholder of legal professional association vicariously liable
for these disciplinary offenses by association's attorneys); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v.
Okocha, 632 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Ohio 1994) (finding that charging "nonrefundable
retainer" of $12,000 plus 40% contingency fee, after first agreeing to "forgo any contingent
fee as well as the retainer fee," "twice violated DR 2-106(A) (charging clearly excessive
fee)," and, in addition to dishonesty and commingling of client funds, warranted indefinite
suspension); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Berger, 597 N.E.2d 81, 82 (Ohio 1992)
(finding that charging 50% contingency fee in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in addition to court-
awarded attorney fees (giving lawyer more than 50% of total damages) and creating strict
confidentiality agreement to hide settlements from bar association warranted one-year
suspension); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Fehler-Schultz, 597 N.E.2d 79, 81 (Ohio 1992)
(collecting contingency fee of 33 % of settlement in serious car accident in addition to 33 %
fee for reducing injured client's insurance reimbursement request (effectively collecting 50%
of total fee which was in excess of the written contingency fee agreement), in addition to
aiding a nonlawyer in practice of law, warranted indefinite suspension).
135. Nonetheless, I counted one of the Ohio bar counsel responses as indicating
recognition of the core ethics issue. See supra note 107.
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